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Eye blink measures have been shown to be diagnostic in detecting deception regarding
past acts. Here we examined—across two experiments with increasing degrees of
ecological validity—whether changes in eye blinking can be used to determine false
intent regarding future actions. In both experiments, half of the participants engaged in
a mock crime and then transported an explosive device with the intent of delivering it to
a “contact” that would use it to cause a disturbance. Eye blinking was measured for all
participants when presented with three types of questions: relevant to intent to transport
an explosive device, relevant to intent to engage in an unrelated illegal act, and neutral
questions. Experiment 1 involved standing participants watching a video interviewer with
audio presented ambiently. Experiment 2 involved standing participants questioned by a
live interviewer. Across both experiments, changes in blink count during and immediately
following individual questions, total number of blinks, and maximum blink time length
differentiated those with false intent from truthful intent participants. In response to
questions relevant to intent to deliver an explosive device vs. questions relevant to intent
to deliver illegal drugs, those with false intent showed a suppression of blinking during
the questions when compared to the 10 s period after the end of the questions, a lower
number of blinks, and shorter maximum blink duration. The results are discussed in
relation to detecting deception about past activities as well as to the similarities and
differences to detecting false intent as described by prospective memory and arousal.
Keywords: credibility assessment, false intent, blink, oculometrics, deception detection
INTRODUCTION
Interest in determining veracity has a long history, with docu-
mented methodologies extending back to at least 900 BC [for a
review, see Trovillo (1939a,b)]. The majority of these efforts have
focused on the detection of deception, a term which has a variety
of characterizations (Masip et al., 2004). A widely accepted defi-
nition of deception is provided by Vrij (2008) as “a successful or
unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in
another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue”
(p. 15). While the temporal period during which this untruth is
committed is unspecified, the majority of research has focused on
detecting indicators of concealed past behavior.
The question arises concerning the ability of determining
whether an individual is being deceptive regarding future inten-
tions. In contrast to knowledge of past activities, intent involves
a goal or plan of action for the future, in which both the execu-
tion of the action and its outcome are uncertain. As such, intent
may be defined as “a person’s mental representations of his/her
planned future actions” (Vrij et al., 2011a), and by extension, false
intent involves misleading others regarding upcoming but not yet
realized actions.
There have been efforts recently to determine if an individual
is misleading others regarding the true purpose, or intent, of their
future actions. Vrij and colleagues (2011a); Vrij and his colleagues
(2011b) have shown differences in verbal responses to ques-
tions between truthful intent participants and those with false
intent in terms of number of words, level of details, plausibility,
contradictions, and corrections. Meixner and Rosenfeld (2011),
using a P300-based concealed information test, were able to detect
with a high level of accuracy individuals who planned a mock
terrorism attack. Aikins et al. (2010) examined changes in res-
piratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) in participants that were either
truthful or were to respond deceptively about a future mock
crime. The data showed greater reductions in RSA during testing
of participants that were deceptive regarding an upcoming task
compared to the truthful intent participants.
Since being untruthful regarding both past and future acts
includes the attribute of a desire to mislead, it has been hypothe-
sized that cues indicative of false intent arise from analogous emo-
tional, cognitive, and behavioral processes involved in deception
(Martin et al., 2007). Traditional deception detection techniques
focus on changes in measures of autonomic functions—such
as respiration, cardiac activity, and electrodermal activity—as
indicators of deceptive responses regarding previous activities
(Abrams, 1989). However, other measures, such as changes in
ocular parameters including eye movements, pupil diameter, and
blink rate, have been examined as possible alternative markers of
deception (e.g., Marchak et al., 2011; Cook et al., 2012).
One of the first examinations of these indices was conducted
by Cutrow et al. (1972). Evaluating multiple physiological mea-
sures, including eye blinks, they concluded that eye blink rate
decreases under circumstances of lying. Fukuda (2001) inves-
tigated the temporal distribution of eye blinks while subjects
performed a guilty knowledge test (GKT) with playing cards. It
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was found that more eye blinks occurred before responses fol-
lowing presentation of the relevant card while more eye blinks
occurred after responses for presentation of irrelevant cards.
DePaulo et al. (2003) reviewed the literature on deception detec-
tion and identified over 100 cues to deception. Of relevance
here, they found that blinking was more prevalent when lies
involved transgressions, discovery of which could have serious
consequences. In another study employing emotionally arous-
ing stimuli in a GKT, Thonney et al. (2005) found a difference
in GKT eye blinking scores for emotional stimuli over neutral
stimuli.
Leal and Vrij (2008) examined blink rates in liars and truth
tellers during and after verbal recall of events and found that liars
showed a decrease in blink rate during deception as compared
with a baseline period and an increase in blink rate in the period
following the telling of the lie. In a study of the GKT with the
same subjects (Leal and Vrij, 2010) they found that liars exhibited
a lower blink rate in response to key items as compared to control
items, but there was no difference for truth tellers.
Taken together, these findings suggest that blink parame-
ters are diagnostic in determination of deception regarding past
actions. These differences can be explained both by theories
of cognitive load (e.g., Fogarty and Stern, 1989; Fukuda et al.,
2005; Irwin and Thomas, 2010) as well as arousal-based theo-
ries (e.g., Stern, 1992). While it is difficult to isolate the spe-
cific cause of the differences in blink behavior between liars
and truth tellers, it appears that the findings are reliable and
repeatable.
The question arises if these same measures can be used to
determine whether an individual is being deceptive regarding
future intentions as opposed to past actions. The present work
attempted to determine if changes in eye blink parameters could
be used to detect false intent. Based on the findings of dif-
ferences in blink parameters between truthful individuals and
those deceptive about prior actions, the primary hypothesis is
that individuals with false intent will exhibit a suppression of
blink rate during intent relevant questions, accompanied by a
rebound in blink rate in the period following the question end,
as well as a lower overall number of blinks and shorter blink
durations when compared to those with truthful intentions. This
effect was examined in two experiments that manipulated eco-
logical validity between a controlled, standardized prerecorded
video presentation of questions and questions presented by a live
interviewer.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
Participants (N = 54) were recruited through advertisements in a
local newspaper and through an online classified advertising site.
A total of 25 (9 female/16 male; average age = 27.76, SD = 8.83)
participated in the false intent condition and 29 (12 female/17
male; average age= 28.05, SD = 9.05) in the truthful intent con-
dition. The experimental design and data collection procedures
were reviewed and approved by the Montana State University
Human Subjects Committee and informed consent was obtained
from all subjects.
Apparatus
Pupil diameter, blink, and eye movement data were collected
using a Smart Eye Pro version 5.4 remote eye tracker. The system
has a 60Hz sampling frequency and is capable of achieving pupil
measurement accuracy to.01mm. Voice responses were collected
using a Cedrus SV-1Voice Key.
Pre-recorded auditory instructions and questioning infor-
mation were presented as sound files using a TDT System
3 Psychoacoustic Workstation through Altec Lansing VS2120
amplified speakers. Video was presented on a LaCie 324 LCD
monitor, a 24-inch widescreen display located 60 cm from the
participant. Data from all sources were time-stamped and syn-
chronized through a Cambridge Research Systems ViSaGe, a
multiple I/O interface, timing and visual stimulus generation
device.
Procedure
Participants responding to the recruitment advertisements were
directed to call a local phone number and were presented with a
voicemail message instructing them to leave a name and number
where they could be contacted.
Four offices in three local buildings were used. Participants
first reported to an intake office in a facility that houses profes-
sional businesses where they completed an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) consent form and were provided directions to the
location of another building, within walking distance, where the
participant was to receive further instructions.
The test site was located in a building approximately ½block
away from the intake office. Participants walked independently
to the building and entered the instruction room. Each par-
ticipant was randomly assigned to a false intent or truthful
intent condition. In both conditions, participants listened to
taped instructions through headphones and were told that in
addition to the $25 USD payment for participation they could
earn an addition $25 USD for successfully passing a credi-
bility assessment test. Participants in the false intent condi-
tion heard instructions in which they were to commit a mock
crime by taking a “fuse lighter” from a downstairs office in
the building and providing it to a “contact” after completing a
credibility assessment test at another location. Documentation
taken from Pickett (1999) was provided illustrating the fuse-
lighter as was a photograph of the fictitious “contact.” In the
truthful intent condition, participants heard instructions in
which they were to remove a note from the door of a down-
stairs office and were not provided with the supplementary
materials.
In both conditions, participants exited the instruction room,
walked around the block, and entered the building through a side
door. They then proceeded downstairs to a basement office. Those
in the truthful intent condition simply removed a sticker contain-
ing numbers from the door. Those in the false intent condition
were required to enter the office and find and remove the fuse
lighter. The office containing the fuse-lighter was furnished to
resemble a working facility.
In both conditions, the participants exited the building
through a third door and proceeded approximately 2 blocks
to our laboratory to take a credibility assessment examination.
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Details of the examination and data collection are provided in the
next section.
DATA COLLECTION
After arriving at the laboratory, both false intent and truth-
ful intent participants were questioned about the event using
a Relevant-Relevant comparison test format (RRT). Based on a
paradigm developed by Kircher and Raskin (2006), the RRT con-
sists of two sets of relevant questions as well as neutral questions
(N). One set of relevant questions addressed matters related to
plans to transport illegal drugs for delivery to another person after
the credibility assessment test (Drug Intent) while the other set of
relevant questions was related to plans to deliver a fuse lighter to
a contact after the credibility assessment test (Explosives Intent).
Both sets of relevant planned actions were to occur after the ques-
tioning and the questions asked about future actions, but only
the Explosive Intent was carried out by those in the false intent
condition. Table 1 provides a list of the questions employed and
question durations in milliseconds.
In contrast to the Comparison Question Test (CQT) format
(Abrams, 1989), in which responses to relevant questions are
compared to responses regarding general undesirable acts (e.g.,
“Before the age of 18, did you ever take something that didn’t
belong to you?”), the RRT compares responses to two types of rel-
evant questions—one directed toward the area of interest and the
other toward an equally relevant area but one in which the exam-
inee has not engaged. In both test formats, neutral questions are
interspersed between the questions of interest to serve as buffers
and permit the examinee’s physiological reactions to return to
baseline levels. In the RRT, those in the truthful intent condition
should have similar responses to both of the relevant question
Table 1 | Test questions and question durations.
Do you live in Bozeman or a surrounding community?
(Neutral)
3005ms
Do you intend to transport illegal drugs today? (Drug Intent) 2610ms
Were you born between nineteen twenty and nineteen
ninety? (Neutral)
3020ms
Do you plan to help cause a disturbance today? (Explosives
Intent)
2420ms
Did you attend elementary school in the United States?
(Neutral)
2890ms
Are you attempting to transport part of an explosive device?
(Explosives Intent)
3520ms
Is today’s date Sunday, February eighth two thousand and
nine? (Neutral)
3610ms
Are you attempting to smuggle illegal drugs today? (Drug
Intent)
2670ms
Are you in Bozeman, Montana at this moment? (Neutral) 2280ms
Do you plan to provide a fuse lighter to someone today?
(Explosives Intent)
3060ms
Did you use public transportation to arrive here today?
(Neutral)
2960ms
Do you plan to provide illegal drugs to another person?
(Drug Intent)
2910ms
types, while those in the false intent condition should have dif-
ferent reactions to the explosives intent questions compared to
the drug intent questions.
In both truthful intent and false intent conditions, partici-
pants stood facing a video monitor and questions were presented
aurally through recordings over speakers simultaneously with a
prerecorded video of an interviewer asking the questions. Ocular-
based parameters were measured in an ambient illumination-
controlled room (15.1 lux above). Participants responded “yes” or
“no” verbally into a microphone and response time was recorded,
but not used in the current analyses due to poor reliability of
the data collection device. Question start and question end was
marked by a time stamp in the video synchronized with the ocu-
lar data. Each question was followed by a 15 s interval before the
next question was presented.
After completing the data collection process, participants were
debriefed. Those in the false intent condition were told that they
did not need to meet a contact, the experiment was completed,
and they were asked to return the fuse lighter. Participants in both
conditions were told that they would receive the $25 USD bonus.
They were then paid and thanked for their participation.
DATA PROCESSING
For each participant, ocular data were time-stamped and syn-
chronized with the video and audio presentation of the questions.
Blinks were identified from the eye tracker data as intervals of
60–1000ms where the pupil diameter was equal to zero. Three
measures were calculated from these data. Blink Count Difference
was determined as the number of blinks in the period from the
end of a question to 10 s after question end minus the num-
ber of blinks during the question presentation. This serves as
a measure of blink suppression during question presentation.
The use of the 10 s time period was suggested by Stern (pers.
Commun., November 20, 2008) based on his experience and was
verified through pilot testing that examined time intervals from
5 to 20 seconds (N = 8). The average duration of all questions
was 2912.92ms, while the average durations for the Drug Intent,
Explosives Intent, and Neutral questions were 2730ms, 3000ms,
and 2960.8ms, respectively. Number of blinks was the total num-
ber of blinks during the question and the 10 s period following
the question end. Maximum blink duration was the length in mil-
liseconds of the longest blink time during the analysis period for
each question.
RESULTS
All participants verbally responded “yes” or “no” to all ques-
tions and none of the responses were eliminated from analysis.
Table 2 presents the raw means and standard deviations of the
blink count difference, number of blinks, and maximum blink
duration for Drug Intent, Explosives Intent, and Neutral ques-
tions for participants in both the false intent and truthful intent
conditions. The ocular-based data were normalized by calculat-
ing z-scores and submitted to a repeated measures multivariate
analysis of variance (RMANOVA). For Drug Intent vs. Explosives
Intent questions, there were significant within-subject multivari-
ate effects for Relevance × Intent condition, F(3, 50) = 3.908,
p = 0.014, η2p = 0.190. There were significant within-subjects
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Table 2 | Raw means and standard deviations for blink count difference, number of blinks, and maximum blink duration (ms) by question
type—Experiment 1.
Measure Drug intent Explosives intent Neutral
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
BLINK COUNT DIFFERENCE
False intent 0.183 0.182 0.134 0.193 0.244 0.172
Truthful intent 0.232 0.205 0.279 0.224 0.266 0.204
NUMBER OF BLINKS
False intent 5.107 3.661 4.467 2.693 5.882 3.319
Truthful intent 5.805 3.999 6.368 4.438 6.823 4.303
MAXIMUM BLINK DURATION
False intent 210.000 149.505 177.760 109.814 221.700 136.474
Truthful intent 201.741 122.883 212.126 119.379 231.398 123.879
FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1—Blink count difference as the number of
blinks in the period from the end of a question to 10 s after question
end minus the number of blinks during the question presentation for
false intent and truthful Intent participants. Error bars show Standard
Error.
effects of Blink Count Difference, F(1, 52) = 6.213, p = 0.016,
η2p = 0.107, and Number of Blinks F(1, 52) = 7.096, p = 0.010,
η2p = 0.120. Maximum Blink Duration approached significance
(1, 52) = 3.526, p = 0.066, η2p = 0.064.
Figures 1–3 show plots of normalized Blink Count Difference,
Number of Blinks, and Maximum Blink Duration, respectively,
for Drug Intent and Explosives Intent questions for partici-
pants in both the false intent and truthful intent conditions.
Participants in the false intent condition showed a lower blink
count difference, fewer numbers of blinks, and shorter but not
significantly different maximum blink duration for the Explosives
Intent vs. the Drug Intent questions.
In order to examine the relationship between the neutral
and relevant questions, the normalized data for the Neutral,
Drug Intent, and Explosives Intent questions were submitted to
a RMANOVA. There were significant within-subject multivari-
ate effects for Relevance× Intent condition, F(6, 47) = 2.585, p =
0.030, η2p = 0.248. There were significant within-subjects effects
of Blink Count Difference, F(2, 104) = 5.328, p = 0.006, η2p =
0.093, and Number of Blinks F(2, 104) = 4.540, p = 0.014, η2p =
FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1—Number of blinks for false intent and
truthful intent participants. Error bars show Standard Error.
FIGURE 3 | Experiment 1—Maximum blink duration for false intent and
truthful intent participants. Error bars show Standard Error.
0.080. Maximum Blink Duration was not significant F(2, 104) =
1.846, p = 0.163.
To examine the effect of age and gender, the data were analyzed
in the same manner as above but with age and gender as between
subject variables. For Drug Intent vs. Explosives Intent questions,
there were no significant effects for Gender by Age, F(21, 45) =
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1.140, p = 0.346, Age by Intent, F(12, 45) = 1.678, p = 0.104, or
Gender by Intent, F(3, 13) = 1.727, p = 0.211.
Tables 3, 4 show the results of a discriminant analysis using
all data and a leave-one-out procedure, respectively, to inves-
tigate how well the three blink parameters successfully classify
false intent and truthful intent individuals. Using all the data,
72.4% of the truthful intent participants and 64.0% of those
with false intent were correctly classified, with an overall correct
classification rate of 68.5%. Results of the leave-one-out analy-
sis found 72.4% of the truthful intent participants and 60.0% of
those with false intent correctly classified, with an overall correct
classification rate of 67.6%.
DISCUSSION
Participants with false intent showed a significantly lower blink
count difference and lower number of blinks for the Explosive
Intent questions as compared to the Drug Intent questions, with
the difference in maximum blink duration approaching signif-
icance, as compared to participants with truthful intent. There
were no significant differences due to age or gender.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHODS
Participants
Participants (N = 57) were recruited through the same avenues
used in Experiment 1. A total of 29 (11 female/18 male; average
age = 26.06, SD = 9.77) participated in the false intent con-
dition and 28 (9 female/19 male; average age = 33.40, SD =
13.18) participated in the truthful intent condition. The exper-
imental design and data collection procedures were reviewed
and approved by the Montana State University Human Subjects
Committee and informed consent was obtained from all subjects.
Apparatus
The same equipment and set up used in Experiment 1 was
employed with the following changes. The video monitor was
replaced with a podium located in front of the participant and a
live interviewer located 60 cm from the participant. AMimo IMO
touch screen input display was used to present the question text
Table 3 | Discriminant analysis classification results—Experiment 1.
Actual Predicted Overall (%)
Truthful intent (%) False intent (%)
Truthful intent 72.4 27.6
False intent 36.0 64.0 68.5
Table 4 | Discriminant analysis leave-one-out classification
results—Experiment 1.
Actual Predicted Overall (%)
Truthful intent (%) False intent (%)
Truthful intent 72.4 27.6
False intent 40.0 60.0 67.6
to the interviewer. A push button was used by the interviewer to
time stamp the question start and question end and synchronize
with the ocular data. The voice key was not used.
Procedure
The procedure and instructions were the same as in Experiment 1.
DATA COLLECTION
The data collection process was similar to that in Experiment
1. After arriving at the laboratory, participants stood before the
podium and a research assistant performed a short calibration
procedure for the eye tracker that involved having the participant
fixate on five spots located in front of them. When calibra-
tion was complete, the interviewer entered and sat behind the
podium. Questions were presented to the interviewer on a Mimo
IMO touch screen display, which also indicated the inter-question
interval time before the displaying the next question. Each ques-
tion was read aloud. When the interviewer was ready, he pushed a
hand-held button to code question start time into the data stream.
After reading the question, question end time was also marked
by the interviewer pressing a button. When the 15 s inter-trial
interval had passed, the display presented the next question to the
interviewer.
DATA PROCESSING
Data processing was identical to Experiment 1.
RESULTS
All participants verbally responded “yes” or “no” to all ques-
tions and none of the responses were eliminated from analysis.
Table 5 presents the raw means and standard deviations of the
blink count difference, number of blinks, and maximum blink
duration for Drug Intent, Explosives Intent, and Neutral ques-
tions for participants in both the false intent and truthful intent
conditions. The ocular-based data were normalized by calculat-
ing z-scores and submitted to a repeated measures multivariate
analysis of variance (RMANOVA). For Drug Intent vs. Explosives
Intent questions, there were significant within-subject multivari-
ate effects for Relevance × Intent Condition, F(3, 53) = 10.362,
p = 0.000, η2p = 0.370. There were significant within-subjects
effects of Blink Count Difference, F(1, 55) = 12.983, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.191, Number of Blinks F(1, 55) = 20.156, p = 0.000, η2p =
0.268, andMaximumBlinkDuration (1, 55)= 18.179, p = 0.000,
η2p = 0.248.
Figures 4–6 show plots of normalized Blink Count Difference,
Number of Blinks, and Maximum Blink Duration, respectively,
for Drug Intent and Explosives Intent questions for partici-
pants in both the false intent and truthful intent conditions.
Participants in the false intent condition showed a lower blink
count difference, fewer numbers of blinks, and shorter maxi-
mum blink duration for the Explosives Intent vs. the Drug Intent
questions when compared to participants in the truthful intent
condition.
In order to examine the relationship between the neutral
and relevant questions, the normalized data for the Neutral,
Drug Intent, and Explosives Intent questions were submitted to
a RMANOVA. There were significant within-subject multivari-
ate effects for Relevance × Intent condition, F(6, 53) = 5.696,
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Table 5 | Raw means and standard deviations for blink count difference, number of blinks, and maximum blink duration (ms) by question
type—Experiment 2.
Measure Drug intent Explosives intent Neutral
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
BLINK COUNT DIFFERENCE
False intent 0.251 0.276 0.302 0.258 0.288 0.269
Truthful intent 0.321 0.224 0.229 0.221 0.256 0.192
NUMBER OF BLINKS
False intent 4.219 3.785 5.130 4.349 4.850 4.520
Truthful intent 4.633 3.201 3.933 3.460 4.634 3.661
MAXIMUM BLINK DURATION
False intent 239.958 113.008 285.505 125.791 245.495 97.888
Truthful intent 217.567 87.608 194.067 71.835 234.250 79.868
FIGURE 4 | Experiment 2—Blink count difference as the number of
blinks in the period from the end of a question to 10 s after question
end minus the number of blinks during the question presentation for
false intent and truthful intent participants. Error bars show Standard
Error.
FIGURE 5 | Experiment 2—Number of blinks for false intent and
truthful intent participants. Error bars show Standard Error.
p = 0.000, η2p = 0.406. There were significant within-subjects
effects of Blink Count Difference, F(2, 110) = 7.448, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.119, and Number of Blinks F(2, 110) = 9.186, p = 0.000,
FIGURE 6 | Experiment 2—Maximum blink duration for false intent and
truthful intent participants. Error bars show Standard Error.
η2p = 0.143. Maximum Blink Duration was significant F(2, 110) =
10.13, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.156.
To examine the effect of age and gender, the data were analyzed
in the same manner as above but with age and gender as between
subject variables. For Drug Intent vs. Explosives Intent questions,
there were no significant effects for Gender by Age, F(18, 51) =
0.763, p = 0.731, Age by Intent, F(15, 51) = 1.012, p = 0.459, or
Gender by Intent, F(3, 15) = 0.131, p = 0.940.
Tables 6, 7 show the results of a discriminant analysis using
all data and a leave-one-out procedure, respectively, to inves-
tigate how well the three blink parameters successfully classify
false intent and truthful intent individuals. Using all the data,
72.0% of the truthful intent participants and 78.1% of those
with false intent were correctly classified, with an overall correct
classification rate of 75.4%. Results of the leave-one-out analy-
sis found 68.0% of the truthful intent participants and 78.1% of
those with false intent correctly classified, with an overall correct
classification rate of 73.7%.
DISCUSSION
Similar to Experiment 1, participants with false intent showed a
significantly lower blink count difference, lower number of blinks,
and lower maximum blink duration for the Explosives Intent
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Table 6 | Discriminant analysis classification results—Experiment 2.
Actual Predicted Overall (%)
Truthful intent (%) False intent (%)
Truthful intent 72.0 28.0
False intent 21.9 78.1 75.4
Table 7 | Discriminant analysis leave-one-out classification
results—Experiment 2.
Actual Predicted Overall (%)
Truthful intent (%) False intent (%)
Truthful intent 68.0 32.0
False intent 21.9 78.1 73.7
questions as compared to Drug Intent questions. However, there
were differences in the responses to the Drug Intent questions as
compared to those found in Experiment 1. One possible expla-
nation for these differences could be related to the difference
of being questioned by a videotaped interviewer and interact-
ing with a live interviewer. While the questions and procedures
were the same, participants in Experiment 1 did not have direct
interactions with a live person. Riby et al. (2012) found a dif-
ference in skin conductance level (SCL) and increased arousal
to live faces compared to video-mediated faces. This increase in
arousal as a result of interacting with a live interviewer could con-
tribute to the differences found in blink parameters between the
two experiments.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this effort was to determine if variations in blink
measures could differentiate between those with false intent
and truthful intent individuals. Two experiments with differing
degrees of ecological validity were conducted using either a pre-
recorded interviewer presented on a computer monitor or a live
interviewer.
To date, the majority of research on determining false intent
has employed verbal or non-verbal cues. Vrij and colleagues
(2011a); Vrij and his colleagues (2011b) successfully detected false
intent employing a structured interview and analysis of the result-
ing transcripts, as well as based on speech cues and participant
willingness to be photographed. Similarly, Clemens et al. (2011)
demonstrated that strategic interviewing elicits reliable cues to
detecting false intent.
Only one study on detecting false intent has examined the use
of physiological cues. Aikins et al. (2010) detected false intent
by examining respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA)—an indica-
tor of autonomic response—showing that individuals with false
intent displayed decreased RSA compared to individuals with true
intentions.
In both experiments reported here, it was found that for ques-
tions relevant to the harmful act to be committed, those with false
intent showed a lower blink count difference, fewer numbers of
blinks, and shorter maximumblink duration for questions related
to their intent compared to questions related to another act for
which they had no intent. These findings are consistent with
previous findings in the literature that used blink measures to
determine deception regarding past activities. While these analy-
ses focused on factors related to blink counts and time, it would be
possible to examine additional measures such as blink waveforms
(Stern et al., 1984).
Two factors could contribute to the findings of differences in
blink parameters of those with false intent: cognitive load and
arousal. Both theories of cognitive load (e.g., Fogarty and Stern,
1989; Fukuda et al., 2005; Irwin and Thomas, 2010) as well as
arousal-based theories (e.g., Stern, 1992) have been implicated in
the context of deception detection.
As noted by Vrij et al. (2011a,b), differences between liars and
truth tellers in both deception about past activities and future
intentions are potentially affected by the increased cognitive load
brought on in the untruthful situation. The effect of cognitive
load on deception detection has been documented (e.g., Vrij et al.,
2006; Leal et al., 2008). The effect of cognitive load on intention
can be examined from two perspectives of memory about future
events: episodic future thought (EFT) and prospective memory.
Granhag and Knieps (2011) have proposed that EFT is the cen-
tral mental process involved in forming an intention and have
used this framework to propose that the activation of a mental
image in the pre-experiencing of an intention will be stronger for
a true vs. a false intention. The current study did not explicitly
test this construct so no comment can bemade on its applicability
based on the available data.
Prospective memory is defined as the process that permits
remembering to engage in an intended action at some partic-
ular point in the future (Kvavilashvili and Ellis, 1996). Kliegel
et al. (2000) describe prospective memory as consisting of three
processes: developing a plan, remembering the plan, and remem-
bering to execute the plan at some future time. In the current
study, those with false intent had a plan to meet a contact and
deliver the fuse lighter after taking the credibility assessment test,
so were engaged in the first two processes but were stopped before
the opportunity to begin the third process.
No studies were found that examined physiological mea-
sures of prospective memory with the exception of Hartwig
et al. (2013), who examined gaze behavior to determine differ-
ent approaches employed in solving prospective memory tasks.
Hartwig et al. (2013) used the skewness of Voronoi cell dis-
tributions of fixation densities to quantify viewing strategies
(Velichkovsky, 1999). Over et al. (2006) demonstrated that dif-
ferent visual tasks can be differentiated by skewness differences in
the Voronoi cell sizes, and that tasks involving the same behav-
ior would have similar skewness. Hartwig et al. (2013) found that
when a prospective memory task was missed, participants exhib-
ited gaze behavior similar to that seen in free viewing, including
differential attention to details over only a few areas of inter-
est. This viewing behavior resulted in a few large Voronoi cells
and multiple small cells. If the prospective memory task was
solved successfully, gaze behavior took on characteristics some-
what between those seen in free viewing and those seen in visual
search, which was characterized by a large number of fixations
across the entire display and many small Voronoi cells. These
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findings seem to imply that different approaches and levels of cog-
nitive effort are involved in carrying out a prospective memory
task and that the different processes are reflected in the ocular
measures.
The effect of arousal on eye blink behavior has been inves-
tigated by Tanaka (1999) who examined the changes in blink
rate, amplitude, and duration as a function of arousal level and
found differences between a high arousal vigilance task and a low
arousal counting task. Thonney et al. (2005) used experimentally
aroused emotions of remorse and guilt and examined the effect
of eye blinking and electrodermal response on Guilty Knowledge
Test accuracy. They found that eye blinking was diagnostic for
only the treatment group but not as accurate as electrodermal
measures.
These findings have implications for further research on
both blink measures and determination of false intent. One
issue involves the contribution of cognitive workload and
arousal to the changes in blink behavior. Both have been
shown to affect blink rate, and while recent research has sug-
gested that such findings are due primarily to cognitive load,
neither this work nor previous efforts (Fukuda, 2001; Leal
and Vrij, 2008, 2010) have explicitly addressed this question.
Thus, no definitive conclusions may be drawn regarding the
specific contributions of arousal and cognitive load to the
findings.
Another factor of interest is distinguishing false intent about
future actions (i.e., plan to deliver object to contact) from lying
about past actions (i.e., the mock crime). In a standard polygraph
examination employing, for example, the Comparison Question
Technique, participants are asked a series of questions, a subset of
which are relevant to the past act, such as the mock crime. Here,
participants were asked questions relevant to their upcoming
actions—delivering an explosive device to a contact that would
use it to cause a disturbance—to be completed in the future
after the questioning. None of the questions referred to activities
previously performed.
Vrij et al. (2011b) explicitly compared differences in verbal
cues and detection accuracy between individuals lying about past
activities and future intentions, and found a higher accuracy
rate in determining false intent, although this may have been
attributed to differences in how the observers scored the tran-
scripts. One way to examine this effect explicitly using the current
approach would be to present truthful intent participants with
information about the mock crime without actual participation
in it or possessing information regarding the future actions and
compare the responses with those who committed the mock
crime.
It might also be possible to add a third condition in which
participants complete the mock crime in terms of obtaining
the fuse lighter but are not told that it is to be delivered to a
contact. Martin et al. (2011) found physiological differences in
several parameters, including pupil diameter, between individu-
als who planned to participate in a malicious event after passing
through screening, without first committing a mock crime or
attempting to smuggle an illegal device, and innocent partici-
pants. Comparisons of the blink behaviors of this group with the
group that intends to meet a contact could provide a direct com-
parison between lying about past actions and false intent. The
findings presented here serve as an initial step toward determin-
ing the ability of using physiological measures to determine false
intent as opposed to lying about previous acts.
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